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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE CLARENCE PACE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BROOKFIELD PRODUCTS, INC. 
et al., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14542 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF tlttl CASE 
This is an action against Defendant-Appellant Brookfield 
Products, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as defendant Brookfield) 
atid others brought by Plaintiff-Respondent Archie Clarence Pace 
(hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) seeking to foreclose on a 
mortgage. Defendant Brookfield counterclaimed against plaintiff 
alleging plaintiff had acquired from but failed to pay defendant 
Brookfield for certain merchandise. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The case came before Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. At the close of argument, 
the Court granted plaintiff's Motion. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant Brookfield seeks to have plaintiff's 
Summary Judgment set aside, the Court's decision reversed and the 
case remanded for trial. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Plaintiff Archie Clarence Pace brought an action against 
defendants Brookfield, Larry F. Pace (plaintiff's son) and Sharee 
F. Pace (hereinafter referred to as defendants Pace) and Kamas 
State Bank (hereinafter referred to as Bank), alleging that 
defendants Pace had executed and delivered to plaintiff a promissory 
note and mortgage and subsequently had defaulted thereon. Plaintiff's 
action was brought to foreclose on said mortgage. Defendant 
Brookfield and the Bank were named as parties to the action 
because of their alleged lien and/or interest in the property 
subject to the mortgage. 
Defendant Brookfield answered denying each and every 
paragraph of plaintiff's complaint and counterclaimed against 
plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff had purchased and accepted 
from defendant Brookfield certain merchandise, the cost of which 
totaled $15,434-45, that plaintiff had failed to pay for said 
merchandise, and that plaintiff was indebted to defendant Brookfield 
in that amount. 
Plaintiff answered said counterclaim alleging that any 
amounts due defendant Brookfield from plaintiff had been satisfied 
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and that there had been a complete accord and satisfaction. 
Plaintiff later submitted interrogatories to defendant 
Brookfield, the questions and answers to which are as follows: 
1. List all documents known to exist by the 
defendant, Brookfield Products, Inc., which show the 
plaintiff owes the defendant Fifteen Thousand Four Hundred 
Thirty-Four and 35/100 ($15,434.35) Dollars. 
Sales delivery tickets. 
2. Where are said documents? Give the name 
and address of each person who has possession of any of 
said documents. 
Brookfield Products, Inc., 4700 South West 
Temple, Murray, Utah. 
3. Are the documents listed above in answer 
to these interrogatories all of the proof the defendant 
has of said debt? If there is other additional proof, 
state what it consists of. 
No. Testimony of Brookfield personnel. 
Sales delivery tickets are proof the 
defendant has. 
4. List all payments received by the defendant, 
Brookfield Products, Inc. on said account and answer the 
following: (a) Date of payment; (b) By whom paid; (c) The 
amount paid. 
None. 
5. Compute how the attorney's fees of Two 
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-One and 78/100 ($2,251.78) 
Dollars have been computed. 
Bar schedule. 
6. Has the defendant ever made demand for pay-
ment on the plaintiff? 
Yes. 
7. If answer to Interrogatory No. (6) is in 
the affirmative then state the following: 
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(a) When was said demand made? 
(b) Who made said demand? 
(c) By what means was said demand made? By 
letter, personal contact, phone, etc. 
Approximately one year and approximately 
eight months ago. Howard Allen. Telephone. 
8. If the answer to Interrogatory No. (6) is 
negative then state why no demand was ever made on the 
plaintiff for payment of the alleged accounts. 
Not applicable. 
Plaintiff then made a request for admissions from defendant 
Brookfield, the questions and answers to which are as follows: 
1. That the defendant, Brookfield Products, 
Inc., has in its possession ledger cards or ledger sheets 
showing charges, payments and balance on the Pace Account. 
Admits paragraph 1 of Request for Admissions. 
2. That defendant, Brookfield Products, Inc. 
holds a mortgage with Ldrry C. Pace and Sharee F* Pace, 
his wife, as mortgagors, said mortgage given to secure a 
Promissory Note in the sum of Twenty-Nine Thousand 
($29,000) Dollars, said note and mortgage bearing the date 
of January 31, 1975. 
The only reason defendant, Brookfield 
Products, Inc., took the mortgage from 
Larry C. Pace and Sharee F. Pace, his 
wife, was because defendant, Larry C. 
Pace, advised defendant, Brookfield 
Products, Inc., he was securing a loan 
to clear off the balance of the account, 
which he failed to do; therefore, defendant, 
Brookfield Products, Inc., felt it was 
necessary to secure some kind of security 
to try to force payment of the account. 
3. That said note and mortgage for Twenty-Nine 
Thousand ($29,000) Dollars includes the Fifteen Thousand 
Four Hundred Thirty-four and 45/100 ($15,434.45) Dollars 
which defendant, Brookfield Products, Inc., claims is 
due them from the plaintiff. 
On several occasions, defendant, Larry C. 
Pace, and plaintiff, Archie Clarence Pace, 
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requested defendant, Brookfield Products, 
Inc., to give plaintiff, Archie Clarence 
Pace, a release which defendant, Brookfield 
Products, Inc., refused to do inasmuch as 
defendant, Brookfield Products, Inc., knew 
nothing of the contract between plaintiff, 
Archie Clarence Pace and defendant, Larry 
C. Pace. 
4. That the ledger cards or sheets show that 
the balance on the Archie Pace Account as of March 1, 1973, 
of Fifteen Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-four and 45/100 
($15,434.45) Dollars was continued in the name of Larry 
Pace and that the purchases, payments and credits were con-
tinued forward from March 1, 1973 the same as they had been 
prior to March 1, 1973. 
See above answer to admission No. 2. 
5. That on the theory of first in first out the 
obligation claimed by defendant Brookfield Products, Inc. 
has long since been paid and there is nothing due and owing 
from the plaintiff to defendant Brookfield Products, Inc. 
See above answer to admission No. 3. 
Plaintiff, on the basis of the pleadings, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, brought a Motion for 
Summary Judgment before the Court, arguing that there was no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that plaintiff, as to 
defendant Brookfield, on its counterclaim, was entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law, The Court, after hearing the arguments 
of counsel, granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as 
prayed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRANSACTION AS DESCRIBED IN AND BASED UPON THE RECORD 
IN THE CASE AT BAR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION INASMUCH AS: 
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A. THERE IS NOT AN OFFER WHICH WILL 
SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ACCORD 
Plaintiff's theory of the case and evidently the basis 
for the Courtfs granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
is that the securing by defendant Brookfield of a mortgage from 
defendants Pace (plaintiff's son and daughter-in-law), under 
the circumstances specified in the record, constituted an accord 
and satisfaction, thereby releasing plaintiff from that indebtedness 
which was owed defendant Brookfield prior to the alleged accord 
and satisfaction. If this is plaintiff's theory, those elements 
necessary for the formation of an accord and satisfaction must be 
satisfied. 
The law concerning the formation of an accord and 
satisfaction generally is that there can be no accord and satisfac-
tion without the making of a new contract, one independent of and 
additional to the source, contractual or otherwise, of the disputed 
claim or claims. 1 Am Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, §4. Utah 
has adopted the general rule as is indicated in Ralph A. Badger & 
Company v. Fidelity Building & Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 
75 P.2d 669 (1938). In Badger, defendant issued a fifty-share 
stock certificate to plaintiff's predecessor in interest, which 
certificate was subsequently surrendered and reissued in two 
twenty-five share certificates, one of which was acquired by 
plaintiff. Plaintiff's predecessor gave notice of intent to 
withdraw the entire matured value of the shares to defendant and 
this notice of intent to withdraw was deemed effective with 
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regard to plaintiff's subsequently acquired twenty-five share 
certificate. Plaintiff alleged fraud, inter alia, in the 
acquisition of the stock, and defendant pleaded accord and satis-
faction. The Court, on appeal, indicated that the principal 
question was whether the evidence disclosed an accord and satis-
faction and cited with approval the above rule found in Am Jur as 
well as several Utah cases consistent with that rule. The Court 
concluded that there was no accord and satisfaction binding on 
the plaintiff. 
Defendant Brookfield would submit that the alleged 
accord and satisfaction in the case at bar be carefully considered 
to determine whether there was a new contract entered into, one 
that was independent of and additional to the original obligation 
between plaintiff and defendant Brookfield. It is elementary to 
the law of contracts that there must be an offer by one party and 
that said offer "must be so definite in its terms.,.that the 
promises and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably 
certain.11 Restatement of Contracts, §32 (1932). Comment a. to 
§32 of the Restatement further provides, "The law cannot subject 
a person to a contractual duty or give another a contractual 
right unless the character thereof is fixed by the agreement of 
the parties." There must be definiteness and certainty concerning 
the subject matter in order for the proposal to be construed as 
an offer. 
In the case at bar, the record and specifically plaintiff's 
Answer to Defendant Brookfield's Counterclaim indicates that the 
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amount and value of the merchandise acquired by plaintiff from 
said defendant is indefinite and uncertain, said defendant alleging 
that plaintiff had purchased some $15,434.35 worth of merchandise 
and the plaintiff admitting that some purchases were made, but 
implying that not all of the alleged purchases were made. In 
order to have an effective accord, the subject matter of the 
offer constituting the basis for the accord must be definite and 
certain. In the instant case, based on the present state of the 
record, the subject matter, i.e., the amount and value of the 
indebtedness, is indefinite and uncertain, and because of this 
indefiniteness there is no effective offer and therefore no 
accord. 
B* THERE IS NOT? AN ACCEPTANCE WHICH WILL 
SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ACCORD 
In Corbin on Contracts, §1277, the author states: 
No Accord and Satisfaction Without Expression 
of Assent. 
The process of making an accord, of inter-
preting the words and acts of the parties, and 
of determining the legal effect thereof, is 
the same as in the case of other contracts. In 
order that a performance rendered by an obligor 
shall operate as a satisfaction of the claim 
against him, it must be offered as such to the 
creditor. There must be accompanying expressions 
sufficient to make the creditor understand, or 
to make it unreasonable for him not to understand, 
that the performance is offered to him as full 
satisfaction of his claim and not otherwise. If 
it is not so rendered, there is no accord, either 
executory or executed, for the reason that there 
are no operative expressions of agreement --no 
sufficient offer and acceptance. 
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The law generally is as stated by Corbin and found in 
1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction, §3.a. wherein it is provided: 
An accord is in essence a contract or agree-
ment, and accord and satisfaction is found and 
dependent on, and results from, a contract, express 
or implied, between the parties, and occurs 
only where the parties intend it and mutually 
assent to it. 
The essentials of valid contracts in 
general must be present in a contract of accord 
and satisfaction; there must be proper subject 
matter, competent parties, an aggregatio 
mentium, or meeting of the minds of the parties, 
and, of course,...a proper consideration. The 
contract must embody a definite offer of settle-
ment, and an unconditional acceptance of such 
offer according to its terms, and it must finally 
and definitely close the matter covered by it, 
so that nothing of or pertaining to that matter 
is left unsettled, or open to further question 
or arrangement. The act or acts to be done 
under the contract must be specified with as 
much cettainty as in any other agreement. 
(Emphasis Added.) 
In Harding Hotel Company v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Company, 133 Wash. 272, 233 P. 276 (1925), plaintiff 
Hotel entered into an agreement with the Tacoma Cabinet Works 
whereby said cabinet company was to manufacture specified furniture 
for the hotel. Defendant became surety for any loss plaintiff 
might incur due to a breach of contract by the cabinet company. 
The furniture manufactured was defective, the cabinet company 
became insolvent, and plaintiff offered to compromise its damages 
by retaining the unpaid balance of price. Subsequently, a bank, 
as assignee of the cabinet company, commenced an action against 
plaintiff seeking to recover the balance of the purchase price of 
the furniture contract. The plaintiff pleaded its damages as an 
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offset and prevailed. As time passed, further defects of a 
latent nature developed and plaintiff made demand for damages 
against defendant. Defendant contended that there had been an 
accord and satisfaction, preventing plaintifffs recovery. The 
Court held that plaintiff's offer of compromise had never been 
accepted and therefore no accord and satisfaction* 
Based on the above, it seems abundantly clear that 
there can be no accord and satisfaction without an unconditional 
acceptance of the offer. 
In the case at bar, defendant Brookfield indicated, in 
its Answers to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions, that a mortgage 
had been taken from defendants Pace (plaintiff's son) for the 
reason that said defendants were securing a loan to satisfy the 
outstanding accounts, and defendant Brookfield wanted an attempt 
to insure satisfaction of said indebtedness by securing the 
mortgage. In said answers, defendant Brookfield further indicated 
that on several occasions plaintiff and defendants Pace requested 
that plaintiff be given a release from his indebtedness and that 
defendant Brookfield look to defendants Pace therefor. Defendant 
Brookfield consistently, and on several occasions, refused to 
release plaintiff from the indebtedness, and in fact, made continued 
demands on plaintiff to pay the indebtedness; defendants Pace, 
insofar as defendant Brookfield was concerned, merely became 
joint obligors with plaintiff. Defendant Brookfield did not 
accept the proposed transfer of indebtedness from plaintiff to 
defendants Pace and defendant Brookfield would submit a fortiori 
without that expression of assent there was no accord. 
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C. THERE WAS NOT AN EXECUTION OF THE ACCORD 
AND THEREFORE NO SATISFACTION 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that an accord was 
reached between plaintiff and defendant Brookfield, said defendant 
would submit that there has been no execution of the accord and 
therefore no satisfaction. In 1 Am Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, 
§47, it is stated: 
The rule is universally recognized that 
except where the new agreement is itself accepted 
as a satisfaction, and except to the extent that 
the rule has been changed by statute, the failure 
to make a payment or otherwise perform an act 
required by a new agreement entered into in 
satisfaction of a debt or claim leaves such an 
agreement a mere executory accord, without 
satisfaction, and as such it constitutes no bar 
to the enforcement of the original claim or debt. 
Restatement of Contracts, §417 (1932), is consistent with the rule jus 
stated and provides as follows: 
...the following rules are applicable to a 
contract to accept in the futute a stated 
performance in satisfaction of an existing 
contractual duty, or a duty to make compensation: 
(a) Such a contract does not discharge the 
duty, but suspends the right to enforce 
it as long as there has been neither a 
breach of the contract nor a justifica-
tion for the creditor in changing his 
position because of its prospective 
non-performance. 
•k i< ic 
(c) If the debtor breaks such a contract 
the creditor has alternative rights. 
He can enforce either the original duty 
or the subsequent contract. 
In the case at bar defendant Brookfield alleges in its 
Answer and Counterclaim that plaintiff purchased and accepted 
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from defendant Brookfield certain merchandise, the cost of which 
totaled $15,434.45, that plaintiff had failed to pay for said 
merchandise and that plaintiff was indebted to defendant Brookfield 
for that amount. Plaintiff, in its Answer to the Counterclaim of 
Defendant Brookfield alleged satisfaction of any bills due and 
owing defendant Brookfield between October of 1972 and March of 
1973. Plaintiff is not arguing in its Answer to Defendant 
Brookfield1s Counterclaim that the mortgage herein referred to 
was itself accepted as a satisfaction. Plaintiff is arguing that 
there was, in fact, a satisfaction of the indebtedness itself and 
in light of the position taken by defendant Brookfield in its 
Counterclaim where it is alleged that said indebtedness had not 
been satisfied, a question of fact is raised. 
Accordingly, defendant Brookfield would submit that 
there has been no execution of th£ accord and therefore no satis-
faction. 
POINT II 
THE PLEADINGS, ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES AND ADMISSIONS ON 
FILE SHOW THAT THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL 
FACTS AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
...The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
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The following principles as specified in 6 Pt. 2 Moore's 
Federal Practice 1f56.23, state generally the guidelines that 
govern the granting of motions for summary judgment: 
All reasonable doubts touching the existence 
of a genuine issue as to material fact must be 
resolved against the party moving for summary 
j udgment. 
It is not the function of the trial court 
at the summary judgment hearing to resolve any 
genuine factual issue, including credibility; 
and for purposes of ruling on the motion all 
factual inferences are to be taken against the 
moving party and in favor of the opposing party, 
and the appellate court will do likewise in 
reviewing the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. Discretion plays no real role in the 
grant of summary judgment; the grant of summary 
judgment must be proper under the above principles 
or the grant is subject to a reversal. The trial 
court may, however, exercise a sound discretion 
iri denyirig summary judgment, appropriate to the 
case at hand, although the movant may have 
technically shouldered his burden. 
The Utah rule first above stated is not unlike the 
federal rule for which Moore's principles have direct application; 
indeed Moore's principles reflect the position taken by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 
11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 (1961), Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960), Thompson v. Ford 
Motor Company, 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964), and Frederick 
Mdy & Company v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). 
Without restating the facts and argument aforesaid, 
defendant Brookfield would submit that there are many genuine 
issues as to material facts in the case at bar. The amount and 
value of the merchandise acquired by plaintiff from defendant 
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Brookfield and as a corollary thereto what payments, if any, were 
made by plaintiff or others toward the satisfaction of the 
indebtedness, the question of whether or not there is any debt 
owing, and the intent of defendant Brookfield in taking the 
mortgage from someone other than the plaintiff Archie Clarence 
Pace (in this case the mortgage, in fact, was taken from plaintiff's 
son Larry G. Pace and daughter-in-law) are all genuine issues as 
to material facts raised in the pleadings, answers to interroga-
tories and admissions on file. Defendant Brookfield would 
therefore submit that plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is not entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
the Trial Court, based on the pleadings, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, improperly granted 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and said judgment should 
be set aside, the Court's decision should be reversed, and the 
case should be remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM 
THOMAS W. FORSGREN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1407 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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